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involved."8 1 This need for protection is no less when modem shore-based equip-
ment is used to carry out the ship's service. There is no just reason for distinguish-
ing between a longshoreman injured by a ship's boom and one injured by shore-
based equipment when the function of the equipment and plaintiffs duties in each
case are the same. Longshoremen who are performing the ship's service in carrying
out the loading and unloading operations should not be penalized by loss of the
protection given by the application of the warranty of seaworthiness by utilization
of more modem equipment. For in this way, the shipowner would be reaping
the benefits of modem labor-saving devices and avoiding the consequences of the
risks the longshoremen must face as a result.
Therefore, due to the high risk of injury within the longshoreman industry
caused by the hazards of the ship's service and the unfairness of placing on the
longshoremen the whole burden of loss aising from the utilization of modem
equipment the loss should be put upon the shipowner by application of the
warranty of seaworthiness whenever an injury arises in the performance of the
ship's service. If the plaintiff is directly engaged in the ship's service and he is
injured by equipment used in carrying out this service, whether it is modem or
traditional equipment, whether it is located on the ship or on the shore, whether
it is furnished by the stevedore or by the shipowner, and whether it is attached
to the ship or not, the warranty of seaworthiness should apply. The next reasonable
step8 2 for the Supreme Court to take should be to adopt this position and extend
seaworthiness to all shore-based equipment used in the ship's service.
John R. O'Brien*
81 Italia Societa v. Oregon Stevedoring Co., 376 U.S. 315, 323, n.10, 1964 A.M.C.
1075, 1082 n.10 (1964).
82 Justice Harlan m his dissenting opinion in Gutierrez v. Waterman S.S. Co., 373
U.S. 206, 216, 1963 A.M.C. 1649, 1658 (1963), shows the inportance of that case in
the trend of seaworthiness recovery-
The decision in this case has importance in admiralty law beyond what might
appear on the surface. It marks another substantial stride toward the develop-
ment by this Court of a doctrine that a slpowner is an insurer for those who
perform any work on or around a ship subject to maritime ]urisdiction.
Accord, Nomus, MAnnma PERsoNAL INjumES 58 (2d ed. 1966).
* Member, Second Year Class.
CAN THE SUITS IN ADMIRALTY ACT LIMITATION
PERIOD BE TOLLED OR EXTENDED?
The United States Government, through its several agencies, carries on a
large share of the maritime activity of this country. Besides owning and operating
military and merchant vessels, it is an active charterer, maritime employer, and a
maritime insurer, to name but a few of its maritime activities. In short, the
Government's operations encompass the entire maritime field, and it is easy to
see why the federal government is a frequent admiralty litigant.
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In order to permit the United States to be sued in admiralty as any other
maritime defendant, Congress, in 1920, passed the Suits in Admiralty Act,1 and
later, in 1925, enacted the Public Vessels Act,2 which removed the bar of govern-
mental iumunity. These two acts provide the exclusive remedy for any claim
brought in admiralty against the United States,3 and the procedural requirements
of either act under which a libel is filed must be complied with in order to invoke
the jurisdiction of a federal district court sitting in admiralty.4
The Suits in Admiralty Act sets forth a two year limitation period within which
suits against the United States must be brought, 5 and this limitation period is
incorporated by reference into the Public Vessels Act.6 Generally, this limitation
has been strictly enforced by the federal courts. For example, the Government
cannot waive the defense of the statutory period, 7 and it has been held non-
extendable and non-tollable because of infancy8 or insanity.9
Tls strict enforcement of the limitation period creates problems, however,
when the substantive admiralty law or other conditions precedent to suit beyond
the claimant's control prevent him from availing himself of the full two year
period within which to bring suit under these two acts. This note will discuss
these problems and suggest a solution.
One problem faced by the courts in this area is the conflict which may arise
because the procedural requirements of another federal statute must be complied
with before suit can be brought under either act. For example, in Liberty Mut.
Ins. Co. v. United States,10 a provision of the Longshoremen's and Harbor Work-
ers' Act and the two year limitation period operated to defeat a subrogation claim
of the insurer of an injured longshoreman against the United States,11 even though
141 Stat. 525 (1920), 46 U.S.C. §§ 741-52 (1964).
243 Stat. 1112 (1925), 46 U.S.C. §§ 781-90 (1964). The Suits in Admiralty Act
provides that a libel in rem may not be brought against the United States. 41 Stat. 525
(1920), 46 U.S.C. § 741 (1964).
3 Johnson v. United States Shipping Bd. Emergency Fleet Corp., 280 U.S. 320
(1930); United States Shipping Bd. Emergency Fleet Corp. v. Rosenberg Bros., 276
U.S. 202 (1928); Thomason v. United States, 184 F.2d 105 (9th Cir. 1950); McKenna
v. United States, 91 F Supp. 556 (S.D.N.Y. 1950).
4 Glover v. United States, 109 F Supp. 701 (S.D.N.Y. 1952), construed the pro-
cedural requirement of the Suits in Admralty Act, 41 Stat. 525 (1920), 46 U.S.C. § 742
(1964).
541 Stat. 525 (1920), 46 U.S.C. § 745 (1964).
643 Stat. 1112 (1925), 46 U.S.C. § 782 (1964), provides that suits under the Pub-
lic Vessels Act shall be subject to the same provisions of the Suits in Admiralty Act so
long as they are not inconsistent.
7 Isthiman S.S. Co. v. United States, 302 F.2d 69 (2d Cir. 1962).
8 Sgambati v. United States, 172 F.2d 297, 1949 A.M.C. 47 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
337 U.S. 938 (1949).
9 Williams v. United States, 228 F.2d 129, 1956 A.M.C. 80 (4th Cir. 1955), cert.
dented, 351 U.S. 986 (1956).
10290 F.2d 257, 1961 A.M.C. 2020 (2d Cir. 1961).
3.144 Stat. 1424 (1927), 33 U.S.C. § 933(b), (h) (1964), provides that acceptance
by a longshoreman of a compensation award from his employer or his employer's in-
surance company operates as an assignment to the employer or insurer of all the em-
ployee's rights to recover damages against a third party causing the injury.
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it was impossible for the insurer to sue earlier. The court held that a suit brought
by the insurer before the termination of the six month period following acceptance
of a compensation award during which the longshoreman could have sued the
third party was premature.' 2 The provision for suit after acceptance of compensa-
tion was construed as giving the longshoreman the exclusive right to sue within
that period. The insurer, thus could not bring suit until twenty six months after
the cause of action arose because the longshoreman delayed twenty months before
accepting compensation, and the later filed suit was held to be barred by the
Suits in Admiralty Act limitation period, leaving the insurer without any remedy.13
The admiralty litigant may also find himself time-barred because of mandatory
administrative remedies. The federal government has, in most situations, provided
for administrative determination of maritime claims against its agencies. Often
these remedies are mandatory and must be exhausted before the claimant can
proceed m admiralty with his cause of action. For example, the administrative
remedy may be required by statute as is the case under the Admiralty Extension
Act which provides for a six month period of administrative determination of
claims against the United States brought under the act.14 The exclusive ]udicial
remedy for such a claim is under the Suits in Admiralty Act or the Public Vessels
Act.15 In Hahn v. United States,16 the elapse of the six month period was held to
be a condition precedent to the jurisdiction of the district court, and the limitation
period was not tolled during the mandatory period of administrative determna-
tion.
The administrative remedy may also be made mandatory by contract. Gener-
ally a maritime contract made with an agency of the United States Government
contains a dispute clause which requires that the complaining party must first
proceed admmistratively,'7 and appeal may be taken only after the required ad-
minstrative procedures have been exhausted.' 8 In States Marine Corp. v. United
1244 Stat. 1424 (1927), 33 U.S.C. § 933(b), (h) (1964), further provides that
within six months after the compensation award is made, the longshoreman may sue
the third party. If the longshoreman does bring suit within six months, the statutory
assignment of his claim to his employer or employer's insurer is non-operative.
13 In another Longshoremen's Act case, Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co. v. United
States, 130 F Supp. 839, 1955 A.M.C. 1245 (S.D.N.Y. 1955), the insurer was again
left without a remedy. A Deputy United States Employee's Compensation Commis-
sioner, whose duty it is to determine the amount of the compensation award under the
Longshoremen's Act, did not make a determination as to the insurer's liability or to
whom the compensation was to be paid until some two years after the accident in wich
the longshoreman had been killed. In the insurer's suit against the United States, the
district court disagreed with the insurer's contention that the statute should be tolled
during the determination by the commissioner.
1462 Stat. 496 (1948), 46 U.S.C. § 740 (1964), which extends the jursdiction of
admiralty courts to include injuries done or consummated on land caused by a vessel on
navigable waters, provides for a six month mandatory period of admnimstrative deter-
inination of a claim under the act brought against the United States.
1562 Stat. 496 (1948), 46 U.S.C. § 740 (1964).
16218 F Supp. 562 (E.D. Va. 1963).
17 32 C.F.R. § 7.103-12 (1966), establishes and requires dispute clauses in govern-
ment contracts in general.
18 32 C.F.R. § 7.103-12 (1966).
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States,1 9 a claim arose against the United States, 20 but States Marine did not file
a formal claim until sixteen months after the damage was consummated. This
administrative procedure took fifteen months, and the court would not allow the
period of admimstrative determination to toll the Suits in Admiralty Act limita-
tion period.
It is clearly evident from the foregoing discussion that the operation of a
mandatory statutory procedure when coupled with the Suits in Admiralty Act
limitation period may bar a claimant who has m fact been diligent in pursuing
Ins claim. It would seem more logical to toll the limitation period while the
claimant is precluded from bringing suit by circumstances beyond his control, so
that the claimant will have the full two year period in which to file Ins action.
The reason most often given for holding the limitation period set forth in the
Suits in Admiralty Act non-tollable is that this type of limitation is a "substantive"
as opposed to a "procedural" statute of limitation which limits a common law
remedy.21 The argument is that the Suits in Admiralty Act created a new right,
the right to sue the United States in admiralty, and with that right, the act pre-
scribed the period within which suit must be brought. It therefore follows that
not only does the cause of action become judicially unenforceable, but the right is
extinguished by the runmng of the statutory period.22
Tins artificial "substantive-procedural" distinction should not be determinative,
however, of whether the Suits in Admiralty Act limitation period can be tolled.
First, there is doubt whether the reasons underlying the creation of the distinction
are properly applicable to the problem under discussion. The distinction had its
origin in The Harrisburg,23 which involved a conflict of laws question, namely,
which statutory period of limitation controls, that set forth in a foreign statute or
that of the forum? The Supreme Court determined that since the limitation period
was part cf the statute creating the right, it qualified the right itself.24 Hence, it
was "substantive" and controlled the timeliness of the foreign suit.
It is arguable that the Suits in Admiralty Act does not, strictly speaking,
create any new causes of action, and therefore the limitation period cannot be
considered "substantive." With respect to causes of action which can exist against
private maritime defendants, a new remedy is given, namely the ability to assert
a similar cause of action against the United States in admiralty.25 The Suits in
19283 F.2d 776, 1961 A.M.C. 254 (2d Cir. 1960).
20 States Marine was a time charterer under contract with the government. The
contract contained a dispute clause and provided that the United States would be liable
for damage caused by its stevedore contractor. 283 F.2d at 776, 777, 1961 A.M.C. at 255.21 Sgambati v. United States, 172 F.2d 297, 1949 A.M.C. 47 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
337 U.S. 938 (1949); Osbourne v. United States, 164 F.2d 767, 1947 A.M.C. 930 (2d
Cir. 1947); The Isonomia, 285 Fed. 516 (2d Cir. 1922); Abbattista v. United States,
95 F Supp. 679 (N.J. 1951); Kruhmm v. United States War Shipping Administration,
81 F Supp. 689 (E.D. Pa. 1949).
22 States Marine Corp. v. United States, 283 F.2d 776, 1961 A.M.C. 254 (2d Cir.
1960); Osboume v. United States, supra note 21, at 768.
23 119 U.S. 199 (1886).
24 Id. at 214.
25 Crescitelli v. United States, 66 F Supp. 894, 896, 1946 A.M.C. 261, 264 (E.D. Pa.
1946); Burkholder v. United States, 56 F Supp. 106, 108, 1945 A.M.C. 759, 762 (E.D.
Pa. 1944).
1036 THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 18
Admiralty Act and the Public Vessels Act were not enacted to create new bases of
maritime liability, but rather to remove the defense of governmental immunity
and permit suit against the United States in admiralty.26 This is clear from the
language of the Suits m Admiralty Act: "In cases where if such vessel were
privately owned or operated a proceeding in admiralty could be maintained
any appropriate nonjury proceeding in personam may be brought against the
United States. "27
Secondly, the reasoning of the Supreme Court in the recent case of Burnett v.
New York Cent. R.R.,28 casts further doubt on the validity of the "substantive-
procedural" argument. Burnett considered the question of the tolling of the
limitation period contained in the Federal Employers' Liability Act.29 The Court
put little stock in the distinction in determining whether a statutory limitation
period could be tolled30 and said it is rather a question of the legislative intent in
enacting the statutory rights and remedies3 1 The Court further stated: "In order
to determine congressional intent, we must examine the purposes and policies
underlying the limitation provision, the Act itself, and the remedial scheme de-
veloped for the enforcement of the rights given by the Act."3 2 After examimig the
legislative intent in enacting the Federal Employers' Liability Act, the Court
held that tolling the limitation period would in this situation effectuate the hu-
mane purposes of the act.
The Suits in Admiralty Act and the Public Vessels Act, however, only provide
the admiralty litigant with a judicial remedy against the United States. The acts
enable the litigant to enforce against the United States only existing rights under
maritime law. On the other hand, in Burnett the Court, in determining whether
to toll the limitation period contained in the FELA, evaluated a statute which was
26Allen v. United States, 338 F.2d 160, 162, 1965 A.M.C. 1229, 1231 (9th Cir.
1964); Maine v. United States, 134 F.2d 574, 575, 1942 A.M.C. 1075, 1076 (1st Cir.),
cert. denied, 319 U.S. 772 (1943).
27 41 Stat. 525 (1920), 46 U.S.C. § 742 (1964). Forgione v. United States, 202 F.2d
249 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 966 (1953), is illustrative of the judicial inter-
pretation of the Suits in Admralty Act, 41 Stat. 525 (1920), 46 U.S.C. § 742 (1964), to
wit, a suit can only be maintained in admiralty against the United States if such action
could be maintained in admiralty against a private party. In Forgione, a libel was ified
alleging false arrest and inprisonment. However, it is well settled that in order to invoke
admiralty jurisdiction for a tort action the tort must be maritime in nature; to be man-
time it must occur on navigable waters, the situs of the tort controlling. The Plymouth,
70 U.S. 20 (1865). The alleged tort occured on land, therefore no cause of action could
be maintained in admiralty and the United States could not be sued under the Suits in
Admiralty Act.
28380 U.S. 424 (1965).
29 35 Stat. 66 (1908), 45 U.S.C. § 56 (1964), provides: "No action shall be main-
tamed under this chapter unless commenced within three years from the day the cause
of action accrued."
30 380 U.S. at 427.
31 Id. at 426. The Court also indicated that the right and limitation being written in
the same statute does not indicate this legislative intent. 380 U.S. at 427 n.2.
32380 U.S. at 427. See Glus v. Brooklyn E. Terminal, 359 U.S. 231 (1959), where
claimant was misled by defendant's agents into believing he had more than three years
to bring an action on a Federal Employers' Laability Act claim. The Court held the
defendant could be estopped from asserting the statute of limitations as a defense.
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not only intended to provide new remedies, but also to alter the common law
rights of an employee against his employer and in the case of wrongful death
to create a new cause of action. 33 Therefore, in applying the theory of Burnett to
determine whether the Suits in Admiralty Act limitation period should be tolled,
the intent of Congress in enacting the statute which creates the admiralty rights
must be examined, e.g., the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation
Act,8 4 the Admiralty Extension Act,35 or the Clarification Act,36 rather than the
intent m enacting the Suits in Admiralty Act which only provides the procedural
vehicle for the enforcement of those rights.
The approach in Burnett was foreshadowed by a district court decision in
Kinman v. United States37 where the district court sitting in admiralty evaluated
the congressional intent in enacting the Clarification Act38 and held the Suits in
Admiralty Act limitation period tollable. The Clarification Act gave seamen on
government vessels the same rights as those on private vessels, but provided for
a period of administrative determination before a seaman could resort to the
admiralty courts.3 9 The issue of whether tis period of required admimtrative
determination would toll the Suits in Admiralty Act limitation period had been
discussed, but not decided, prior to Kinman. The Supreme Court in McMahon v.
United States,4 9 resolved a conflict between the circuits as to whether the limita-
tion period began to run from the date the cause of action arose or from the date
of administrative disallowance. 41 The Court resolved the conflict by deciding the
period ran from the date of injury,42 but failed to decide whether the mandatory
period of administrative determination would toll the limitation period. 48
The district court in Kinman was faced with two conflicting rules of construc-
tion: (1) that legislation for the benefit of seamen is to be construed in their favor;
and (2) that statutes waiving governmental immunity are to be construed strictly
in favor of the government. 44 The court therefore looked to the intent of Con-
88 35 Stat. 65 (1908), 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1964).
3444 Stat. 1424 (1927), 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-50 (1964).
35 62 Stat. 496 (1948), 46 U.S.C. § 740 (1964).
3657 Stat. 45 (1943), 50 U.S.C. § 1291 (Supp. 1964).
37 139 F Supp. 925 (N.D. Cal. 1956).
38 57 Stat. 45 (1943), 50 U.S.C. § 1291 (Supp. 1964).
39 The War Shipping Administration, the agency employing the seamen, provided
that as a condition precedent to any suit against the United States by a seaman or sur-
viving dependent, the claun must be administratively disallowed and provided for a
sixty-day period after the claim was presumptively disallowed. General Order 32, 8 Fed.
Reg. 5414, § 304.23 (1943). This requrement of administrative disallowance was juris-
dictional, and therefore a district court could not entertain a suit until the claim was
disallowed. Rodinciuc v. United States, 175 F.2d 479, 1950 A.M.C. 1604 (3d Cir. 1949),
cert. denied, 338 U.S. 895 (1949).
40 342 U.S. 25, 1951 A.M.C. 1913 (1951).
41 Thurston v. United States, 179 F.2d 514, 1950 A.M.C. 456 (9th Cir. 1950), held
the limitation period ran from the date of administrative disallowance. Both MacInnes v.
United States, 189 F.2d 733, 1951 A.M.C. 140 (1st Cir. 1951) and Gregory v. United
States, 187 F.2d 101, 1951 A.M.C. 339 (2d Cir. 1951) held the limitation ran from
the date of injury.
42 342 U.S. at 28, 1951 A.M.C. at 1915.
43 Ibid.
44 139 F Supp. at 928.
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gress in enacting the Clarification Act and found that the object of the legislation
was to give the government seaman the same rights as a private seaman. 45 The
court reasoned that since private seamen have a full two years within which to
file suit, the Government seamen should also have a full two years. The court
therefore concluded that the limitation period was tolled for a period of sixty
days during administrative proceedings.
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has applied the principles of
Burnett to admiralty, when it held the Suits in Admiralty Act limitation period
was tolled while the claimant exhausted mandatory administrative remedies. The
case, Northern Metal Co. v. United States,46 involved a contract dispute between
Northern Metal, a stevedoring company, and the United States Army. The steve-
doring contract contained a dispute clause.47 Northern Metal complied with the
provisions of the dispute clause, but found that after the Armed Services Board
of Contract Appeals had disallowed its claim, the two year limitation period of
the Suits in Admiralty Act had run. Northern Metal argued that the limitation
period was tolled during the period of administrative action and, therefore, it
should be allowed to proceed in admiralty. The court agreed, finding that the
intent of Congress in providing a statutory scheme of administrative relief for
contract disputes was, in part, to provide a system whereby litigation could be
avoided when a claim could be administratively decided. Although Congress
limited the number of instances where appeal could be taken to the courts, 48 it
did not intend to deny all rights to appeal. Therefore, the court reasoned that to
hold that the statute had run while administrative proceedings were pending and
subsequently deny judicial review would be out of harmony with the intent of
Congress in providing for limited judicial review. 49
Some federal courts which have held that the limitation period cannot be
tolled while the claimant is prevented from bringing suit have not discriminated
carefully in choosing authority upon which to rely. In arguing that the limitation
period should be tolled the claimant is often met by Sgambati v. United States5 o
and Williams v. United States,51 which basically stand for the proposition that
the time limitation of the Suits in Admiralty Act will not be tolled because of
infancy or insanity, respectively In neither case, however, was the claimant
totally precluded from bringing suit. In Sgambati, the court pointed out the dis-
tinction in saying "the plaintiff could have sued by a next friend within the two
years." 52 Likewise, in Williams the claimant could have brought suit by having
a guardian appomted. 8 These cases clearly do not rule out the conclusion that the
45 Ibtd.
46 350 F.2d 833 (3d Cir. 1965).
47 32 C.F.R. § 7.103-12 (1966).
4868 Stat. 81 (1954), 41 U.S.C. § 321 (1964), the so-called "Wunderlich Act,"
enacted after the Supreme Court had limited judicial review of departmental decisions
under dispute clauses to cases of fraud. United States v. Wunderlich, 342 U.S. 98 (1951).
19 350 F.2d at 839.
60 172 F.2d 297, 1949 A.M.C. 47 (2d Cir.), cert. dented, 337 U.S. 938 (1949).
51228 F.2d 129, 1956 A.M.C. 80 (4th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 986 (1956).
Both Hahn v. United States, 218 F Supp. 562, 566 (E.D. Va. 1963), and Burch v.
United States, 163 F Supp. 476, 480 (E.D. Va. 1958), seem to misapply Williams.
52 172 F.2d at 298, 1949 A.M.C. at 48.
53 228 F.2d 129, 1956 A.M.C. 80 (4th Cir. 1955), cert. dented, 351 U.S. 986 (1956).
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limitation period can be tolled where the claimant is prevented from bringing suit
by circumstances beyond his control.
In support of this proposition is the decision of the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit in Osbourne -. United States,54 where the limitation period of
the Suits in Admiralty Act was tolled. Osbourne involved an unusual factual
situation in which a civilian seaman on a United States merchant vessel bad been
injured by the negligence of the United States. The vessel was torpedoed, and
the seaman was taken prisoner and interned by the enemy for the remainder of
the war. Within a year of hIs release, but well beyond the two year limitation
period, the seaman filed suit. The court allowed the period to be tolled during
the time of imprisonment, since the enemy had made the courts unavailable to
the seaman.
On its face, Osbourne stands for the proposition that a limitation period "will
toll for one who is a prisoner in the hands of the enemy in time of war."55 Federal
courts reluctant to toll the Suits in Admiralty Act statutory period have so con-
strued Osbourne, narrowly limiting its application to exactly those circumstances.5"
The decision should not be so restrictively interpreted however, rather it should
apply whenever the claimant has been demed access to the courts because of
circumstances beyond Ins control. Once the claimant shows he has in no way
prevented the bringing of suit, the factual distinctions giving rise to the delay
should not govern. The results are the same judicially- the admiralty court cannot
hear the claim.
To illustrate this compare Osbourne with Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. United
States57 and Hartford Ace. & Indem. Co. v. United States,58 previously dis-
cussed.5 9 In all three cases the claimant was precluded from bringing suit within
the two year limitation period. The reasons being respectively, imprisonment by
the enemy, inaction of a Deputy United States Compensation Commissioner, and
a delay caused by a longshoreman's failure to accept a compensation award. The
limitation period was tolled only in Osbourne. Admittedly, the facts vary greatly
and the insurance companies probably have extra-]udicial possibilities for rectify-
ing the situation not available to a seaman in a German prison camp;60 however,
the effect is the same ]udicially, no ]unsdiction and no judicial determination.
There is no reason why the Suits in Admiralty Act limitation period should be
tolled in one instance and not the others.
The argument for tolling the Suits in Admiralty Act limitation period is
further strengthened when the general purposes of statutes of limitations are
examined. Statutes of limitations are designed to insure fairness to defendants and
54 164 F.2d 767, 1947 A.M.C. 930 (2d Cir. 1947).
55 Id. at 769, 1947 A.M.C. at 933.
56 Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co. v. United States, 130 F Supp. 839, 843, 1955
A.M.C. 1245, 1250 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
57 290 F.2d 257, 1961 A.M.C. 2020 (2d Cir. 1961).
58 130 F Supp. 839, 1955 A.M.C. 1245 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
59 See notes 10, 13 supra and accompanying text.
60 The court in Liberty Mutual stated that relief from the statute should be gotten
from Congress. 290 F.2d at 259, 1961 A.M.C. at 2023. Also, the insurer or employer,
aware of the possible time-bar, could influence the longshoreman into making a timely
acceptance of the compensation award.
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to prevent surprise by stale claims.6 1 Surely, the Government cannot complain
of unfairness or surprise, when the claim is, in fact, pending before one of its
administrative agencies. Also, a claim can hardly be considered stale when it is
being admimtratively decided or it is being determined according to statutory
provisions.
Conclusion
When the United States, as an admiralty defendant, pleads the running of the
limitation period as a defense, this defense, if allowed, will as effectively bar the
maritime claimant as if he had failed to show grounds for recovery under sub-
stantive admiralty law. The claimant may find himself precluded from recovery,
not because he does not have a good claim under admiralty law, nor because he has
failed to be diligent in pursuing bis claim, but because of the operation of the
adinmstrative or judicial machinery, which was, in fact, established to allow him
to recover.
When, because of a procedural aspect of a substantive statute or the pendency
of a mandatory administrative remedy, the admiralty claimant is prevented from
having the full statutory period within which to pursue his claim judicially, the
Suits in Admiralty Act limitation period should be tolled or extended during the
penod m which the claimant is so precluded.
Robert A. PFahl*
61 Bumett v. New York Cent. R.R., 380 U.S. 424, 428 (1964).
* Member, Second Year Class.
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